On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered on an emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in a peace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able to restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in the territory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to have participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff and international media wasn't enough, so the Council decided to send a "fact-finding mission" to Jakarta.
On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prize winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau, though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard, now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them. More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, and the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.
Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesian annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind to the fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when more than 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in a cematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the "civilized" nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words of condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (a dictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economic ties binding European and American states to Jakarta.
The five days which mediated until official results were announced were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spots in the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced the results, minutes after the United Nations' Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while an overwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the path to independence.
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Реферат опубликован: 4/09/2009